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The Information Society (TIS) 
 
Surveillant Institutional Eyes in Korea: From Discipline to a Digital 
Grid of Control 
 






This paper investigates the shift from disciplinary societies (the visible and physical violence of 
power) to control societies (the modulating and normalizing techniques of power) in South 
Korea. At the institutional level, during the period of repressive and disciplinary society in Korea 
(1948–1992), the regulatory control systems of the state were mainly performed by two 
formidable apparatuses: the national ID system and the National Security Law. On the other 
hand, the deployment of institutional power since 1993 has been based on the logic of free-
floating control, dispersion, normalization, and modulation. The present study examines how the 
techniques of power were gradually transformed from a centralized and hierarchical model into a 
distributive and dispersed network model, based on flow, speed, and mobility. 
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SURVEILLANT INSTITUTIONAL EYES IN KOREA: FROM DISCIPLINE TO A DIGITAL 




This paper examines how the techniques of power have shifted in South Korea from the 
authoritative governments (1948–1962) and the military dictatorships (1963–1992) to the civilian 
governments (1993–present). While the former regimes made the people sense the physical 
presence of the observer or controller, the civilian administration has been normalizing the 
regulatory control by means of more de-centered and modulated techniques of control. Using 
Foucault’s concept of “disciplinary societies” and Deleuze’s concept of “control societies,” we 
will see how the techniques of power were gradually transformed from a centralized and 
hierarchical model into a distributed and ubiquitous network model. Before investigating the 
metamorphosis in techniques and technologies of power, we will examine some concepts that 
illuminate how the character of regulatory control has transformed in Korea.     
 
Free-Floating Control 
In his “postscript on control societies,” Deleuze ([1990] 1995) contrasts Foucault’s concept of 
“disciplines” with the concept of “controls.” According to Deleuze, the “disciplinary societies” 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should be differentiated from the kind of society we 
have today.  He describes today’s societies as “control societies,” and sees them superseding the 
disciplinary societies Foucault talked about. Deleuze’s division of societies into these two 
periods—that of discipline and that of control—reflects digitization of information in modern 
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society and its application for reproduction of power systems. In other words, he sees control 
societies as based on digital technology, while disciplinary societies on analog technology. 
Digital technology facilitates free-floating control and continuous flows of information between 
databases without spatial-temporal restraints, while analog has the logic of “confinement” and 
“moldings” that divides up units into physical cells and molds such as factories and prisons, 
where monitoring is performed from a physical watchtower. Under digital conditions of control, 
Deleuze observes that masses become floating samples and data. Gandy (1993) notes that 
personal information is “produced through the monitoring of behavior, and not the behavior 
alone” (p. 76). Just as workers’ actions in a workplace are managed by the employers, and as 
consumers in everyday life are identified, classified, and evaluated by private corporations, 
through the so-called “panoptic sort,” what new technologies enhance is the ability to digitize, 
collect, sort, and control the activities of citizens in the public space (Gandy, 1993). In this 
respect, digital technology becomes a new means for modern power to escape from the 
confinement of barriers, fences, and borders into the free-floating control of flow, speed, and 
mobility.  
 
Invisibility of Power  
In a move similar to Deleuze’s distinction between disciplinary societies and control societies, 
Bauman (2000) divides capitalist modernity into two phases using the concepts of “solidity” 
(analog) and “liquidity” (digital). He observes that the pyramid of power has increasingly been 
built on “access to the means of transportation and the resulting freedom of movement” (p. 10). 
Bauman notes that the principal strategy in the exercise of power has become exterritorial and 
unbounded. He regards the “melting of solids” in the current capitalist system as the “revenge of 
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nomadism over the principle of territoriality and settlement” (p. 13). This rejection of any 
territorial confinement means that for the use of power, it rarely matters now “where the giver of 
the command is” (p. 11). Bauman’s metaphor of “liquid” power is useful in conceiving a 
dispersive, de-centered, and even neutralized power. This wide dispersion of power techniques 
makes it easier to conceal the goals of control. As Foucault ([1976] 1990), says “power is 
tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself” (p. 86). Accordingly, power 
seeks to make “all things visible by becoming itself invisible” (Foucault, 1980, p. 71; also see 
Foucault, [1975] 1995, p. 187). The invisibility of power has been greatly increased by the 
dispersed and “value-neutral” techniques of high-tech panoptic devices such as radio frequency 
identification (RFID) chips, electronic bugs, geographic positioning system (GPS), wireless 
tracking techniques, and other fine-grained data-mining software. These devices have been 
accompanied by new hegemonic values that persuade people to embrace “digital sublime” and 
thereby gain consensual acceptance of them throughout society. In effect, the new techniques of 
power are a cunning prosthesis that extends its scope and a deceptive mask that hides its 
savagery, so as to reduce the antipathy of individuals to structural control.  
 
Modulation and Assemblage of Differences  
If power has difficulties in integrating the liquid, free-floating, and dispersed practices of 
surveillance into its library of “databases,” power’s regulatory mechanisms are likely to be 
incomplete (Poster, 1990). Thus modulation of power on a large scale is impossible without 
interconnected networks. Raely (2004) notes that interconnected networks make up “modulating 
networks of command” (p. 125). Although Raely’s research focused on the current shift of the 
global capitalist system, in other words, on “societies of ‘imperial’ control” (e.g., Galloway, 
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2001), the concept of “modulating networks of command” is quite useful for analyzing the new 
techniques of control. Raely explains the modulating system of power as “a loose assemblage of 
relations characterized by […] flexibility, functionality, mobility, programmability, and 
automation” (p. 132). The technology permitting such an assemblage is the electronic network, 
which “abstracts human bodies from their territorial settings and separates them into a series of 
discrete flows” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 605). The loose but integrated communication 
network is the “instrumental facilitator” of power (Raely, 2004, p. 135). Raely concludes that the 
new mechanism of power “need” not necessarily operate through domination, subjection, and 
imposition, because it now operates through insinuation, which is a modal switch of power and 
consists of hosts accepting rather than rejecting or being forced to accept” (p. 135). When the 
spatial conduit of electronic communications becomes the material infrastructure of 
contemporary power, modulation and assemblage become the technical standards of common 
protocols or codes that link up the free-floating data of individuals, groups, and classes.   
 
The Solid and Disciplinary Power 
In South Korea up through at least the early 1990s, both physical violence, such as torture and 
imprisonment (typical in a pre-capitalist society), and discipline (representative democratic 
society) were used conjointly as the techniques of power. The grid of military-authoritarian 
practices that threatened citizens’ public rights was pervasive: the national ID system identifying 
each Korean, the use of paramilitary violence to break unions, the use of closed-circuit TV’s for 
policing, and the widespread practice of government eavesdropping, and politically-motivated 
investigations of activist citizens, among other methods. During the 1970s and 1980s, the regime 
in power employed a wide variety of means to compel most citizens to become docile subjects: 
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imposing a curfew, forcibly shearing the hair of “hippies,” torturing political activists, searching 
citizens’ possessions on the street, silencing the voice of leftists in the public arena, and so forth.  
 At the institutional level, during the period of repressive and disciplinary society in Korea 
(1948–1992), the regulatory control systems of the state were mainly performed by two 
formidable apparatuses: the national ID system and the National Security Law. In the name of 
ferreting out spies or sympathizers aligned with the communist North Korea and of protecting 
South Korea from the dangers of communist infiltration and influence, the National Security 
Law (NSL) was enacted in December 1948 under Syngman Rhee, the first president of the 
republic (1948–1960). Over the next half century, military dictators used the NSL’s elastic 
definition of “anti-state groups” to suppress political opponents. The NSL, which is still in force 
and was last revised in 1996, still defines “anti-state groups” in such a way as to allow arbitrary 
interpretation of the term.  Article 2 states that “anti-state groups refer to domestic or foreign 
organizations or groups whose intentions are to conduct or assist infiltration of the Government 
or to cause national disturbances” (Revised in 31 May 1991). The NSL prescribes up to seven 
years in prison for those who praise, encourage, disseminate the materials of or cooperate with 
anti-state groups (Article 7), and five years’ imprisonment for failure to report “anti-state” 
activities (Article 10). Using this law, any dictator who desires to punish political opponents can 
legally imprison or even execute them, relying on the law’s ambiguous language. Although 
Korea’s Constitution declares that “all citizens enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and of 
assembly and association” (Adopted on 17 July 1948: Chapter 1, Article 21), the NSL has 
empowered the government to effectively override the Constitution.  
Many countries have used identity cards in one form or another, but the national ID 
system in Korea is a total surveillance system identifying each Korean. All citizens are required 
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to obtain and to carry such an ID card. If the police ask to see the card, one must be able to 
provide it. Each citizen must obtain a personal identification number given by the state, which 
must then we used for all kinds of purposes, some of which are described below, over one’s 
lifetime.  Also, all citizens over the age of 17 must have all ten fingerprints on file. The Korean 
governments have defended the bureaucratic efficiency of the system and emphasized that it is 
the price to be paid for the protection of the citizens from crimes and for identifying victims in 
accidents. But then, the government’s databases accumulate a great deal of private information, 
collecting over 140 different pieces of profiling information for each individual. This project of 
regulating the entire citizenry was established under Cheong-Hee Park, the first dictator who 
came to power via a military coup and who held the presidency from 1963 to 1979. In 1968 he 
extended the notorious registration system to the whole populace. This ID system is not much 
different from that of a Big-Brother-type “superstate,” which regulates all citizens with a 
thirteen-digit personal reference number1 not unlike the bar code system used on commercial 
goods.  A citizen would have severe difficulties without it, because one must submit it any time 
one buys certain goods, rents a house, drinks a beer in a bar, applies for loan from a bank, applies 
for employment at business or school, or even when one posts a comment on the Internet. The 
regulatory control of citizens is an extreme example violating fundamental human rights of 
privacy, because it is permanent in duration and vast in scope.  
By using the regulatory weapons of the national ID system and the NSL, military 
dictators controlled the citizens for more than forty years. The worst of them, General Doo-hwan 
Chun, who ruled from 1980 to 1988, was a notorious despot who suppressed people’s desire for 
democratization, and who knew how to maintain power with the help of intelligence agencies. 
Just before he came to power via the military coup in 1979, Chun took control of both the Korea 
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Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA)—which was created in 1961 under the presidency of Park 
and was renamed the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in 1999—and the Defense Security 
Command (DSC), whose original mission focused on counter-communist activities and fighting 
military corruption. After the success of Chun’s coup, the KCIA and the DSC were used as 
domestic surveillance and spying agencies to collect, analyze, and fabricate intelligence data on 
the citizenry. 
The integration of the intelligence agencies, the national ID system, and the NSL enabled 
the development of an extreme disciplinary society to manage the “abnormal” or “other,” such as 
striking workers, protesting students, progressive politicians, and, in general, any citizen critical 
of the government.  
 
The Liquid and Normalizing Power   
After a long period of repression under military regimes, Korean citizens were eager to have 
more political rights such as freedom of speech, expression, and assembly, among others. These 
changes were facilitated by the government’s drive to shift the Korean economy from traditional 
labor-intensive industries to cultural or knowledge-based economies. For instance, to promote 
broadband Internet networks at the national level, in March 1999 the Korean government and the 
Ministry of Information and Telecommunication launched the “Cyber Korea 21” (CK21) project 
aimed at creating a “knowledge-based society” in order to improve “national competitiveness” 
and raise “the quality of life to the level of the more advanced nations” (NCA, 2002, p. 79). 
CK21 increased policy support for building IT businesses and established policy goals for 
advanced information and communication economies by setting forth planned guidelines for IT 
growth. And, in fact, the quality of life was improved by the opportunities open up by broadband 
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networks.  In 2003, CK21 evolved into the “E-Korea Vision 2006” (E-KV06), which has the 
goal to both promote the “information society” at the national level and to gain “strong ties of 
international cooperation toward the global information society” (NCA, 2003, p. 10). Recently 
the government has launched the slogan “U(biquitous)-Korea,” which is intended to encourage 
the integration of all communication systems and electronic devices; the government hopes 
thereby to promote the image of South Korea as one of the world’s most developed Internet and 
wireless nations. 
Due to the government’s neo-liberal IT policies, the number of mobile phone and Internet 
users is rapidly growing in South Korea: as of January 2005, there were more than 36.5 million 
registered mobile phone users out of a population of 48 million and more than seven out of 10 
households have broadband Internet access. According to the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (OECD, 2005) data, the process of digitalizing all 
telecommunication networks in Korea was completed in 2003. In fact, most Koreans spend most 
of their time on electronic networks—playing online games in Internet cafés, decorating their 
blogs, communicating with each other using mobile devices, connecting with hobby or other 
interest groups through Internet portal sites, and exchanging audio-visual materials with others. 
This constant communication through electronic media and the rise of a culture of free 
expression via these media offered opportunities for controlling the communicative networks of 
Korean “netizens.” 
Because the disciplinary mechanisms of the past military regimes conflict with the 
gradual need for the citizen’s political freedom, the power system since the launch of the civilian 
government has tended to reconfigure itself using more “positive” and “soft” technology by 
creating integrated databases. The urban geographical concepts of so-called “fortified” cities 
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(Davis, 1990) or “carceral” cities (Soja, 1996) reflect the new stage of Korea’s domestic policing 
of space in terms of the pervasive and omnipresent technology. Table 1 shows a timeline of 
regulatory control of electronic communications under the civilian governments.   
 
Table.1 Regulatory Control of the Electronic Networks during the Civilian Governments 
Dates Events 
(1993–1998)    The Presidency of Young-sam Kim  
Nov     1997 
 
– Submitted revision plan of the “Resident Registration Act” (including introduction  
   of the electronic ID card), but it was defeated by the citizens’ opposition 
(1999–2003)    The Presidency of Dae-jung Kim 
   –       1999 – Instead of e-ID card, introduced the plastic resident registration card  
 Jul      2000 
 
– Proposed to enact the so-called “Framework Act for Establishment of the Public Order 
   in Telecommunications”  
Nov     2001 
 
– Introduced the “Rating System of Internet Contents,” led by the Information  
   Communication Ethics Committee 
Mar     2003 
 
– Introduced the “National Education Information System” (NEIS) to manage more than  
   200 records of personal information of 8 million students in a main server computer  
Jun      2003 – Installed 340 CCTV (Closed-Circuit TV) systems (360 degree rotation/ 22-times  
   zoom-in) in Kangnam-Ku district in Seoul, sparking social protests 
Oct      2003   – Allowed investigators to access short text message of cell phones without a warrant 
Nov     2003 – Proposed the “Protection Act from Terrorism,” which aims at improving the  
   investigative power of the National Intelligence Service  
(2004–present)    The Presidency of Moo-hyun Noh 
Sep      2004 
 
– Proposed an “Act on the Use and Protection of Location Data,” which offers little  
   protection to the citizen from illegal mobile tracking by a third party 
Feb      2005 
 
 
– The Samsung SDI’s mobile tracking scandal: Samsung secretly tracked  
   union workers by using cloned cell phones, but the Prosecutor terminated the     
   investigation because of the extreme difficulty in locating perpetrators 
Jun      2005 
 
– Proposed revised edition of the “Protection Act of Telecommunications Secrets,”     
   which allows the prosecutor easily to access personal calling messages 
Oct      2005 – New ID cards planned for 2007 to protect against ID forgery 
Oct      2005 
 
– Installed CCTV systems  (270-times zoom-in/ visibility range of 1km) in a restored      
   green area of Cheonggyecheon, Seoul, and accumulated over 3 million citizens’ image   
   information   
Dec     2005   – Proposed revision of the “Act on Promotion of Information and Telecommunication  
   Network Use” to enact the “Enforced Real-Name System,” mainly led by the Ministry   
   of Information and Communication (MIC), for the purpose of forcing users to put their   
   real names and resident ID numbers whenever posting any message on the Internet  
 
Even under the civilian governments, the control mechanisms of disciplinary societies such as 
the national ID system and the National Security Law have been used as devices to manage the 
citizens. However, with the new information and telecommunications policies driven by the 
civilian governments, and especially, by two presidents, Dae-jung Kim and Moo-hyun Noh, the 
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rigid and visible techniques of power have become more integrated with and veiled by the digital 
networks, that is, the techniques of control have shifted to more refined and invisible ones. The 
drive toward regulatory control evidenced in the timeline of events from 1997 to 2005 found in 
Table 1 can be summarized under three main headings: (1) the institutional desire for digitization 
and updating of the traditional disciplinary devices such as the national ID system and the CCTV 
(Closed-Circuit TV) system; (2) the continuous legitimatization of the control of the electronic 
space by means of legal devices; and (3) the “invention of the positive technologies of power” 
(Foucault, [1999] 2003, p. 48) for the purpose of free-floating control in both wired and wireless 
space.  
The invention of the positive technologies for free-floating control is the most significant 
of all of these, because it can hide under an ethical patina the real intention of control directed at 
establishing the new digital rule of cybersociety. For instance, the enforcement of the “real name 
system” prevents anonymity of expression, which can be considered as a form of pre-censorship. 
Moreover, the new technique of control embeds the old disciplinary technique of the national ID 
system within it, because it uses the national ID database to verify real names on the Internet. 
Introduced under Dae-jung Kim’s government (1999–2003), the “rating system on Internet 
contents” has been actually used for stifling minority voices on the Internet such as those of the 
politically radical, gay and lesbian, drop-out student, and feminist communities. In contrast with 
the “real name system,” the rating system on Internet contents can be considered as a form of 
post-censorship, which intends to regulate “aberrant” Websites that deviate from the ruling norm 
of power. Along with these institutional trials of pre- and post- censorship on the Internet, there 
has been an increased desire for surveillance on a real-time basis in the wireless sphere. For 
instance, the use of mobile phones for labor control in the Samsung SDI case confirms once 
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again the abnormal and undemocratic tendencies of the organizational culture of Korean business 
surveillance, with the government’s acquiescence in longstanding practices of the domestic 
monopolies such as the blacklisting of militant workers. Recently, the government is reviewing 
the idea of imbedding RFID tracking chips in mobile phones. 
Not only the enforced interception of free-floating data on the Net but also the centralized 
integration of local databases are symptoms of a control society. The introduction of the 
“National Education Information System” (NEIS) is a typical case of the central government 
modulating and assembling locally dispersed micro-powers. The government used the plea of 
“efficiencies” of systematic management to justify bureaucratic control of citizens, specifically, 
of the eight million students in Korea. The NEIS manages all students’ private records in a 
central government computer. The nationwide database system links the information of over ten 
thousand school and education agencies in a central server managed by the Ministry of 
Education. The students’ records (academic, health, activity, and family records) which had been 
previously managed in each school or district have been integrated into the central database of 
the Ministry, and that database is once again to be integrated and resorted into the national ID 
number database and other databases of individual and private personal information (which 
means a new stage of integration and articulation between micro-power in the local and macro-
power in the central government). The interconnected links and integrations of data have been 
designed for extending the tentacles of regulatory control of power into local schools and 
agencies.  
 
The Alternative to Liquidity of Power, Counter-Surveillance 
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To bolster bureaucracy’s capacity for social control, Korea’s civilian governments have tried to 
shift power from the solid disciplines into the free-floating control of digital databases. With this 
conjoining of digital technologies and bureaucratic control, the citizens’ privacy rights have been 
vaporized and their losses are more difficult to perceive than in disciplinary societies. Moreover, 
the confluence of the underdeveloped political system, vulnerable customers who are sorted by 
business interests, the societal lack of interest in privacy, and the self-monitoring mobile culture 
among cell phone users have normalized the pervasive use of liquid power.  
 In order to resist such invisible and concealed power, citizens’ privacy rights should be 
cultivated by reversed tactics of surveillance such as the counter-surveillance or so-called 
“synopticon” (Mathiesen, 1997) that enables the public not only to monitor power’s surveilling 
eyes but also to resist surveillant networks of power. Whereas, in its original conception, the 
panopticon is a disciplinary model for supervising prisoners from an all-seeing high-tower, the 
counter-surveillance or “synopticon” designates a reversal in which the many (the citizens) 
watch the few (the powerful). In other words, if panopticism is a strategy of power through 
reconfiguration of place, counter-panopticism is a strategy of resistance through an inversion of 
the place of power. In control societies, place has been transformed into “flows.” The greater the 
role communications networks play in the production and reinforcement of power, the more the 
citizens are enabled to re-appropriate the dominant system of liquidity. It is likely that the same 
conditions that reinforce abilities of power can also empower the citizens. Even under seemingly 
rigid control, political tension exists between the codification of power and its rearrangement by 
the intervention of human agents. The digital network as a site of contestation is “simultaneously 
a description of the material of contemporary [global] power, and the necessary form of counter-
insurgencies opposed to this power” (Brown & Szeman, 2005, p. 379).   
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In Korea, after entering a stable phase of civilian rule, the citizens’ political actions have shifted 
from the street barricades and Molotov cocktails to resistance of society’s dominant discourses 
on electronic forums. This upsurge of digital expression among the Net users who resist 
authoritative control systems can work to counteract the liquid and fluid techniques in the 
contemporary control of power.  It is in this activism that the hope for the future resides. 
 
                                                
Notes 
 
1 In the Korean ID system, each identifier (e.g., 681207–1xxxxxx) consists of a combination of the date of birth (the 
first group of six digits; in this case, the date of birth is 7 December 1968), sex (this is the first number of the second 
seven digits: 1 was assigned to a man and 2 to a woman, but, since 2002, these numbers have been changed into 3 or 
4), and a randomly given six-digit number. 
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